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4 
TOWARD A METHODOLOGY 
FOR MEASURING AND 
ASSESSING RACIAL AS 
DISTINGUISHED FROM 
ETHNIC IDENTITY 
Janet E. Helms 
University of Maryland at College Park 
In the 1970s, as an offshoot of the civil rights movements of that 
era, applied psychologists began to grapple with the issues of how to 
measure racial and ethnic identity. Given the increased emphasis on 
improving the life circumstances of disenfranchised peoples in the 
United States, practitioners and applied social and behavioral scien-
tists sought pragmatic strategies for determining how best to inter-
vene in the environments primarily of peoples of color in order to 
contribute to positive mental health outcomes for them as well as 
society more inclusively (Sue, 1992). 
However, as Helms (1990a) noted, the sophistication of theoretical 
models and formulations used to explain the psychological effects of 
being socialized in racially oppressed and culturally distinct social 
groups far outsh'ipped efforts to develop strategies for assessing the 
relevant psychological aspects of racism and ethnocenh·icism. Thus, in 
her overviews of existing theoretical models that purported to address 
aspects of racial or ethnic identity, Helms (1990a, 1990b) located 11 
models for African Americans, six for White Americans, two for Asian 
Americans, two for Latino/Hispanic Americans, and four for Native 
Americans. She also noted that some of the theorists that she reviewed 
considered that they had developed models of "ethnic" or "cultural" 
identity, whereas others contended that they had developed models of 
"racial" identity, although each seemed to be addressing aspects of the 
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same societal dynamics of in-group/out-group oppression. In gen-
eral, it seemed to be the case that theorists who believed that their 
own discomfort with race or ethnicity was due to racism and the 
resulting racial discord developed theories of racial identity, whereas 
theorists who felt that their societal disempowerment was due to 
cultural mismatch of some sort developed theories of ethnic identity. 
However, problems with this language of convenience are that it 
helped to perpetuate the imprecision in terminology in psychological 
research when matters of race, ethnicity, or culture are discussed. 
Furthermore, such imprecise usage makes it difficult to operationally 
define any of the relevant constructs. Consequently, Helms (1994a, 
1994b) recommended that identity models be considered "racial" 
models if they describe reactions to societal dynamics of "racial" 
oppression (i.e., domination or subjugation based on racial or ethnic 
physical characteristics commonly assumed to be racial or genetic in 
nature). She suggested that identity models be considered "ethnic" 
models if acquisition or maintenance of cultural characteristics (e.g., 
language, religious expression) are defining principles. 
Each of the models that Helms summarized had in common the 
underlying assumption that an in-group racial or ethnic identity was 
formed by contrasting oneself and one's societally ascribed racial or 
ethnic group against the dominant White group if one was a Person 
of Color or the Black group if one was White. Each of the models also 
assumed that societal stereotypes and attributions about one's racial 
or ethnic group are internalized by each person, and influence his or 
her responses to racial or ethnic stimuli. Yet some of the theories 
emphasized the intrapsychic processes by which the ingroup /outgroup 
comparisons occurred (e.g., stages of development), whereas others 
emphasized the outcomes of differential socialization (e.g., personal-
ity types). Since Helms's original reviews, the number of theoretical 
models for describing the racial identity of each of the racial groups (e.g., 
Sabnani, Ponterotto, & Borodovsky, 1991) as well as various ethnic 
groups (e.g., Hutnik, 1991; Phinney, 1990) has continued to proliferate. 
However, it is more difficult to count the number of measures of 
racial or ethnic identity primarily because there is no clear 
conceptualization of what constitutes "measurement" of racial or 
ethnic identity, or for that matter, what is meant by "racial" or 
"ethnic" identity. In addition, measurement efforts have been ham-
pered by a variety of other problems. Perhaps the most important of 
the measurement dilemmas are the absence of an articulated model 
for measuring and assessing processes of identity as distinguished 
from outcomes, and the lack of common measurement approaches for 
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measuring processes in which person-by-environment interactions 
are considered to be critical aspects of the process. As a result, 
researchers have attempted to force processes that are conceptualized 
as operating on an individual person-environment level to conform to 
group-level measurement principles (Helms, 1989). 
Often the incongruence between conceptual models of racial identity 
and the measurement models by which they are operationally defined 
has resulted in the misinterpretation or misapplication of classical mea-
surement theory in addressing certain types of measurement issues 
common to process-identity measures. The primary purpose of this 
paper is to discuss each of these issues as they pertain to measurement 
of racial identity as distinguished from etlmic identity. 
A second purpose is to propose strategies for increasing the pragma-
tism of existing racial identity measures. The issue of pragmatism with 
respect to racial and etlmic identity measures has been virtually ignored, 
even though assessment of identity was the issue that originally fueled 
theorists' (e.g., Cross, 1971; Vontress, 1971; Milliones, 1980) efforts to 
describe racial and ethnic identity in applied psychology. Pragmatism 
refers to usage of such measures to intervene in and/or assist the 
assessed person to make decisions about his or her life. 
To make this latter point, it is necessary to distinguish "measure-
ment" from "assessment." Aftanas (1994) makes the following dis-
tinction: "Assessment is the process of obtaining informa tion that 
may be prenumerical, such as identifying that one has more of 
something than another person has. There are many different instru-
ments in psychology that give us this information, including human 
judgment. When an appropriate method can be found to convert this 
information into numerical information, then we can conclude that 
measurement has occurred" (Aftanas, 1994, p . 889). Graham and Lily 
(1984), who consider the use of standardized tests a part of the 
assessment process, further stipulate that assessment ought to pro-
vide information that enables the assessor to make and communicate 
inferences or predictions about the person being assessed. Although 
neither explicitly says so, assessment usually is intended to occur at 
the individual level, that is, to have implications for individuals. 
Nevertheless, viable racial or ethnic identity strategies for assessing 
individuals either do not presently exist, or are not widely known. 
Defin itions 
Adequate measurement or assessment of either racial or ethnic 
identity requires a clear definition of the constructs that one intends 
to measure. Helms (1994a, 1994b) noted that in psychological re-
146 HELMS 
search, part of the difficulty in operationally defining racial factors in 
particular is the ambiguous language used to discuss "racial" and 
"race-related" (e.g., ethnic groups, culture) constructs. With respect 
to racial and ethnic identity, the measurement problems are further 
complicated by the nebulous meaning of "identity." Therefore, it 
seems necessary to propose some terminology by which racial and 
cultural matters in conjunction with identity might be discussed. 
Nevertheless, the proposed terminology is not necessarily intended to 
convey the message that there is only one right way to discuss such 
matters, because the contemporary lexicon of race and culture-fo-
cused language is in such disarray that the only correct usages are 
those on which one can obtain some consensus at the time. Thus, the 
subsequent definitions are Helms's (1994a) attempt to begin the 
discourse concerning development of terminology that is less equivo-
cal. She contends that reduction in the confusion with respect to 
terminology will make it possible to increase the conceptual clarity in 
the research process where issues of racial and ethnic identity mea-
surement and assessment are concerned. 
Prior to Helms's (1994a) observations about the lack of meaningful-
ness to scientists of commonly used "racial" terms, several authors (e.g., 
Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Jolmson, 1987; Yee, Fairchild, Weizmann, & 
Wyatt, 1993; Shibutani & Kwan, 1965) had noted the tendency of 
researchers to collude with society in using concepts such as race, ethnicity 
or ethnic group, and culture as though they have a clear common meaning 
and are interchangeable. Of this triad, the concept that is most important 
for racial identity theory and measurement is the notion of "race" as a 
psychological construct, whereas for ethnic identity measurement the 
constru,cts of "ethnicity" and "culture" are more germane. 
Race 
According to Gordon (1976), "Race, technically, refers to differen-
tial concentrations of gene frequencies responsible for traits which, so 
far as we know, are confined to physical manifestations [phe-
notypes] such as skin color or hair form; it has no intrinsic 
connection with cultural patterns and institutions" (p. 32, italics 
added). The obvious implication of Gordon's definition is that 
societal racial categories are biologically or genetically defined. 
However, many scholars (e.g., Spikard, 1992; Zuckerman, 1990) 
have advised that if different biologically determined racial 
groups exis t anywhere in the world (a doubtful premise at best), 
it is not in the United States where a long history of involuntary and 
voluntary cross-group miscegenation has resulted in so-called mutu-
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ally exclusive "racial" groups, which share biological and genetic 
ancestry in typically unassessed amounts. 
In anthropological, psychological, and medical research as well as 
lay society, a person's "racial" category typically has been "mea-
sured" by means of crude indicators of phenotypes or physical 
appearance (Helms, 1994a; Jackson, 1992; Yee et al., 1993). As is true 
of society more generally, preferred indicators in the social and 
behavioral sciences have included imprecise "empirical" criteria such 
as perceived skincolor, self-reported racial classifications, and re-
searcher racial designations. However, Scarr (1981) notes that pheno-
types reveal virtually nothing about a person's underlying "racial" 
genetic composition. Offspring of the same set of parents may 
demonstrate different phenotypes (e.g., skincolor), whereas offspring 
of different parents may exhibit similar phenotypes (e.g., skincolor). 
People of the same racial classification may exhibit different pheno-
types, whereas people of different racial classifications may exhibit 
similar phenotypes (Zuckerman, 1990). Moreover, Jackson (1992) 
contends that existing anthropological models have never been ad-
equate for demonstrating the presence of biologically defined racial 
differences worldwide, given their frequent assumption that geo-
graphic locations differentiate racial populations from one another. 
One consequence of the crudeness of measurement of race is that 
people who possibly are genetically similar are treated as though they 
are different. In other words, racial categories that have no known 
valid inclusion criteria (other than legally defined standards and 
social custom) become the definers of who is permitted access to 
societal resources and define the manner in which such access can 
occur (Gotunda, 1991; Takaki, 1993). Helms (1994a) proposes that the 
term "sociorace" replace "race" in acknowledgement of the fact that 
typically the only criteria used to assign people to racial groups in this 
country are socially defined and arbitrary: In other words, racial 
classifications are imposed. Be that as it may, at an individual level, 
a person's ascribed status in the society initially depends upon the 
location on the racial hierarchy of her or his outwardly defined group 
(Spikard, 1992). 
Racial identity may be broadly defined as the psychological or 
internalized consequences of being socialized in a racially oppressive 
environment and the characteristics of self that develop in response to 
or in synchrony with either benefitting from or suffering under such 
oppression. Some theorists (e.g., Vontress, 1971) conceptualize the 
characteristics as stable personality "types," whereas others (Hardiman, 
1982; Helms, 1986, 1990a, 1995) describe them as "stages," 
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"worldviews," or "ego statuses." The primary focus of this paper is 
the racial identity perspectives that purport to examine dynamic 
processes such as stages or statuses rather than static pers0l1ality traits 
or types. Given the foregoing definition, then the relevant measure-
ment and assessment tasks are to construct measurement devices for 
quantifying differential levels or amounts of relevant internalized 
oppression-related characteristics, and adapting them for usage at the 
individual or person level. 
Ethnic Group and Ethnicity 
In an effort to overcome the research limitations that result from 
the reification of race as a biological construct, some theorists have 
attempted to resolve conceptual ambiguities by substituting the terms 
"ethnic group" or "ethnicity" for "race" (e.g., Gordon, 1976; Johnson, 
1987). However, this linguistic compromise ignores the importance of 
ethnicity as a distinct construct. Ethnicity implies membership in a 
particular group. According to The American Heritage Dictionary, 
ethnic is defined as "Of or pertaining to a social group within a 
cultural and social system that claims or is accorded special status on 
the basis of complex, often variable traits including religious, linguis-
tic, ancestral, or physical characteristics" (Morris, 1975, p. 450). 
It should be noted that although "physical characteristics" is 
included in the definition, in fact, one does not have to share the same 
physical attributes to belong to an ethnic group. For example, Casas 
(1984) notes that Latinos/Hispanics can be of any racial classification, 
even though they may share Spanish cultural heritage. Also, Spikard 
(1992) has observed that members of the African-American ethnic 
group historically only have needed 1/32 (i.e., "a drop") of presumed 
African ancestry in order to be classified as "black." 
Moreover, inclusion of presumably visible physical characteristics as 
a definer of ethnicity rather than race belies the fact that historically such 
information was used to identify people as belonging to different "racial" 
groups (see Spikard, 1992; Takaki, 1993). For example, in this regard, 
Takaki has noted that for most of their history in this country, Asian 
Indians were classified by society as "Caucasian" but not of the White 
race. Although ethnic groups may exhibit physical manifestations of 
their group-specific culture (e.g., clothing, symbols), these markers typi-
cally are not permanent. In most cases, when they are removed, the 
person is assumed to be of and is treated by outgroups as though he or 
she belongs to the socioracial group he or she most resembles. 
Betancourt and Lopez (1993) recommend that "ethnicity [be] used in 
reference to groups that are characterized in terms of common national-
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ity [h"ibe, community, or geographical region], culture, or language [of 
one's original ancestors in this country]" and share an "ethnic quality or 
[group] affiliation ... which is normally characterized in terms of culture" 
(p. 631). Thus, the critical ingredients in their conceptualization of 
ethnicity is culture. Consequently, from their perspective, "ethnic group" 
implies a group whose members are identifiable because of shared 
cultural characteristics which can transcend societal racial categories. 
Gordon (1976) subsumed a variety of racial and cultural (e.g., 
language, religion) groups under the generic label of "ethnicity." His 
justification for doing so was that due to historical experience, each 
group shares with the others "a sense of peoplehood" and this group 
kinship is recognized in the American lay public's often interchange-
able use of racial and cultural terms. However, it can be argued that 
not only do people have different internal representations of their 
various potential types of groupness or peoplehood, that is, social 
categories, but also that these various representations differentially 
influence their covert and overt behavior. 
With respect to racial identity, for example, the inner sense of 
interconnectedness presumably results from the historical circum-
stances of racial domination or subordination, whereas with respect 
to ethnic identity, common cultural socialization is assumed to be the 
source of interconnectedness. Thus, presumably, even if societal racial 
oppression no longer existed, multiple ethnic groups still might exist 
to the extent that different cultural socialization was needed to insure 
a people's survival and/or the members of the ethnic group contin-
ued to value their own culture. 
Moreover, it can be argued that American society conceptualizes 
race and ethnicity differently. Hypothetically, ethnicity is something 
to be abandoned or blended into a common societal or "American" 
melting pot. Therefore, acknowledgement of ethnicity is largely 
voluntary, whereas race is not. For example, governmental agencies 
such as the Census Bureau only include ethnic-group classifications if 
they are requested to do so vociferously enough by the groups who 
intend to use the categories (e.g., Takaki, 1993). 
Ethnic classifications rarely have differential long-term implica-
tions for national social and political policy in and of themselves, 
unless specific phenotypes also accompany them. Furthermore, 
ethnicity typically is permitted to adapt itself across generations to 
conform to environmental conditions. However, race is valued or 
devalued according to which group one belongs to, and is considered 
to be deep-rooted and life-long, although the number and names of 
the groups may change to reflect societal sensitivities. For example, 
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the "mulatto" and "coloreds" group designations in the 1870 Census 
became "blacks" in later censuses (Spikard, 1992). 
Be that as it may, in order to measure or assess ethnicity, the 
researcher must measure cultural manifestations in some manner. 
Thus, the critical measurement and assessment issues for ethnic 
identity theorists are to (a) operationally define the group-specific 
culture (i.e., ethnicity) in a manner that visibly distinguishes it from 
reactions to racial oppression, and (b) determine the extent to which 
the identified culture has been absorbed. Otherwise, ethnicity and 
race are merely redundant. Table 1 summarizes the dimensions that 
are proposed to differentiate (socio)race from ethnicity. 
Culture 
Psychological or internalized culture might be defined as those 
beliefs, values, customs, traditions, and rituals that are transmitted in 
Table 1. Summary of Characteristics That Distinguish Sociorace From 
Ethnicity 
Sociorace 
Defines group members' position 
in a societal hierarchy 
For most people, it is not mutable 
Does not define a single culture 
Implies know ledge of racism and 
own-group racial stereotypes 
Determined by law and custom 
For most people, it lasts across 
generat ions 
Can generally be recogni zed by 
out-group members 
Does not require the person to do 
anything to belong 
Does not require infusion of 
immigrants or visits to homeland 
to persist 
Characteristics 
Ethnicity 
Does not define a definite place in a 
societal hierarchy 
It is mutable for all people 
Defines a single culture 
Implies knowledge of own-group 
culture 
Determined by in-group desires 
For most people, it virtually disap-
pears after three generations 
Can rarely be recognized by out-group 
members 
Requires some fam iliarity with 
group's cu lture to belong 
Requires an ongoing infusion of 
immigrants or sojourns to a homeland 
to persist 
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some form across successive generations of a group, are present 
during critical eras of a person's lifespan socialization, and become a 
part of the person's llmer psychological experience. Triandis (1994) 
distinguishes between subjective culture (e.g., values), meaning those 
aspects of culture that a person learns or ll1corporates as a part of 
oneself; and objective culture, meaning the products (e.g., art work) 
that typify a particular cultural group. Also, Helms (1994a) distin-
guishes between metacultures and cultures. Thus, she suggests that the 
dOmll1ant culture, that is, the culture to which everyone in a society is 
expected to conform, is a metaculture, whereas cultures are the customs 
of smaller social groups and communities within the society such as 
ethnic groups. In the United States, contemporary Anglo-Saxon culture 
is the metaculture (see Alba, 1990; Feagin, 1984; Katz, 1985). 
Presumably, familiarity with and competence in one's subjective 
culture(s) is the substance of ethnic identity and its measurement. 
However, knowledge of or capacity to express a particular culture is 
not the essence of racial identity or its measurement, although atti-
tudes and feelings toward or evaluations of group-specific cultures 
might be relevant content. In other words, racial identity theorists 
usually hypothesize that a person might choose to embrace or reject 
a culture assumed to typify one's societally ascribed racial group, 
even if he or she has inaccurate knowledge about and/or is not 
competent in the culture(s) involved. 
Identity 
Racial and ethnic identity measurement problems are compounded 
by the fact that the term identity has no clear conceptual meaning. 
Erikson (1963, 1968) is generally considered to be the personality 
theorist who not only made the term identity a watchword in psychol-
ogy, but also explicitly incorporated the notion of collective identities 
(e.g., occupational, gender, religious) into a theoretical formulation. 
Thus, he described a developmental process by which a person could 
integrate most of his or her various social group memberships into a 
healthy personality configuration. 
Briefly, Erikson proposed that in general, psychosocial identity 
development is characterized by the following four-stage develop-
mental sequence: (a) foreclosure, commitment to specific personal 
and group-defined goals, values, or beliefs without ever considering 
other alternatives; (b) diffusion, a lack of solid commitments or efforts 
to establish them; (c) moratorium, a state of crisis during which a 
person explores his or her life options; and (d) achieved, firm social 
commitments based on engaging in and resolving personally relevant 
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life crises. This portion of his model is relevant to the issue of 
measurement and assessment of racial and ethnic identity because 
measures derived from this perpective are often used in racial! ethnic 
group comparison studies (see Phinney, 1990). 
Nevertheless, anticipating future measurement problems, Erikson 
complained that identity "is used without explanation as if it were 
obvious what it means"; and researchers use terms such as "self-iden-
tity" as though they refer to "social roles, personal traits, or conscious 
self-images, shunning the less manageable and the less obscure (and 
often more sinister [racial]) implications of the concept" (Erikson, 1966/ 
1976, p. 60). However, for him, identity meant "a subjective sense of 
invigorating sameness and continuity" (emphasis in original). 
Erikson (1975) proposed that psychosocial identities in particular 
were characterized by an individual (Le., intrapsychic) and a commu-
nal component. For him, the intrapsychic aspect involved the person's 
complex internal experiences in reaction to ingroup and outgroup 
socialization relative to a group. A part of this intrapsychic aspect 
was "a subjective sense as well as an observable quality of personal 
sameness and continuity, paired with some belief in the sameness and 
continuity of some shared world image" (p. 18). The communal 
component refers to the person's interpersonal relations within his or 
her own collective environment(s), where adequate adjustment is 
defined as her or his capacity to be integrated into that community by 
adequately fulfilling social roles given the relevant historical circum-
stances. Other social or collective identity theorists (e.g., Tajfel, 1978) 
also suggest that communality may refer to the interplay between 
majority-status and minority- status groups (i.e., intergroup relations) 
and the person's adaptation to those dynamics. 
Racial identity theorists tend to emphasize the illtrapersonal or 
intrapsychic ramifications of the person's interpersonal and intergroup 
conditions of oppression, whereas ethnic identity theorists tend to em-
phasize interpersonal (e.g, social role fulfillment) and/or intergroup 
dynamics (e.g., acculturation). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that racial 
identity theorists would choose operational definitions of identity that 
permit assessment of internal processes. Similarly, ethnic identity theo-
rists seem apt to use operational definitions that assess the person's fit 
within his or her group(s) as well as the metacultural group. 
WHAT ARE RACIAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY? 
Although Erikson (1968) perhaps introduced the notion of racial 
classification (specifically, membership in the "American Negro" and 
"white majority" groups) as critical aspects of personal identity devel-
4. IDENTITY MEASUREMENT 153 
opment, he did not include it as a potential source of identity enhance-
ment. In addition, although his theoretical framework has been used 
so far to discuss the conceptual difficulties in measuring and assessing 
racial and ethnic identity, it would be fallacious to consider his work 
to be a direct ancestor of most contemporary racial and ethnic identity 
theorists because judging from the absence of citations of his work in 
most of their reference lists, it is unlikely that these theorists were 
aware of his work. Rather, it is more appropriate to suggest that racial 
identity theories are in the genre of Erikson. 
Be that as it may, later theorists (e.g., Cross, 1971; Thomas, 1971) 
began to conceptualize racial identity as a developmental process that 
potentially had positive as well as negative implications for visible 
racial/ethnic group (VREG) individuals residing in the United States 
as well as members of the White majority group. Originally, theorists 
who conceptualized racial identity as involving a developmental 
process used the construct of "stages" to describe the process. How-
ever, Helms (1995) has suggested that "ego statuses" be used instead 
because it is more consistent with theoretical descriptions of the 
developmental process as involving not necessarily obvious or con-
scious intrapsychic person-environment dynamics that are central to 
the person's racial self-conception. As previously mentioned, Helms 
(1990a; 1990b) summarizes many of these models. Also, Phinney 
(1990) reviewed empirical studies of racial and ethnic identity, al-
though she does not differentiate between the two. However, the 
racial identity models that have generated the most measures (Helms, 
1984; Helms, 1990; Helms & Carter, 1990; Parham & Helms, 1981) and 
measurement controversy (e.g., Ponterotto & Wise, 1987; Tokar & 
Swanson, 1991; Swanson, Tokar, & Davis, 1994) are those developed 
by Helms and her associates. Therefore, it might be useful to slUmnarize 
briefly the basic principles of her racial identity conceptual models, and 
discuss some measurement implications for development or evaluation 
of the Black (Helms & Parham, 1985) and White (Helms & Carter, 1990) 
racial identity measures, the measures whose psychometric soundness 
has been challenged most frequently. Also, conceptual models and 
measures of ethnic identity will be briefly discussed to permit consider-
ation of the possibility that racial and etlmic identity might be better 
served by different measurement models. 
General Principles of Racial Identity 
Racial identity theory and consequently, racial identity measure-
ment deals with the psychological consequences to individuals of 
being socialized in a society in which a person is either privileged (i.e., 
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White identity) or disadvantaged (e.g., Black and other People of 
Color identity) because of her or his racial classification. Thus, the 
biological or genetic realities or illusions of race are not relevant 
aspects of racial identity conceptualizations. Rather, the focus is on 
examining the person's internalized reactions to being treated as 
though he or she belongs to a "real" racial group. Thus, in the United 
States, members of the Asian, Black, Latino/a, Native, and White 
American groups are typically treated in society as though they 
belong to different mutually exclusive racial groups when such is not 
truly the case. Moreover, individuals who are known mixtures of 
more than one of these societally ascribed groups also tend to be 
socialized according to the physical appearance of oneself or one's 
presumed ancestors. Thus, racial assignment is evident in statements 
such as he or she "looks" Hispanic or ___ (fill in the blank). 
As previously discussed, it is the case that socioracial groups (and 
consequently members of those groups) occupy different positions 
along the national sociopolitical power hierarchy such that in the U.S., 
Whites are assumed to define the superior group, whereas Blacks are 
assumed to be their opposites or the inferior group, with all other 
groups of color falling somewhere between the two extremes (d. 
Hacker, 1992; Spikard, 1992). Moreover, differential treatment or 
racial discrimination is such that Whites on average occupy the top 
rungs of the societal sociopolitical and economic hierarchies, whereas 
Blacks on average occupy the bottom rungs. The other socioracial 
groups typically occupy intermediate rungs, although the order of 
their occupation may vary depending upon which dimension is being 
considered. 
Thus, for racial identity theoretical and measurement purposes, it 
is assumed that lower status socioracial groups generally contrast 
themselves against Whites, whereas Whites generally contrast them-
selves against Blacks. Considerable empirical evidence exists to the 
effect that Whites generally consider Blacks to be their "opposites," 
although the term "blacks" historically was more inclusive of all 
groups of color than the term "Blacks" is today. Such evidence 
includes several decades of social distance and racial stereotype 
studies (Feagin, 1984; Gardner, Lalonde, Nero, & Young, 1988). Also, 
Gardner et a1. (1988) reported that even when objective surveys of 
racial attitudes indicate a diminishment in such biases, more subtle 
forms of measurement (e.g., behavioral measures) reveal that they are 
still prevalent. 
Unfortunately, People of Color are rarely asked about their feel-
ings and attitudes about either other groups of color or Whites in 
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empirical studies. Consequently, the supposition that conflictual 
relations with Whites define the primary racial identity themes of 
People of Color is based on previously cited theoretical formulations 
in which Whites were identified as the relevant contrast group. Most 
of these perspectives propose similar thematic concerns, although 
their concepts may be differently labeled (e.g., Atkinson, Morten, & 
Sue, 1989; Myers, Speight, Highlen, Cox, Reynolds, Adams, & Hanley, 
1991). 
Thus, Helms's Black (and People of Color) and White models 
differ in content so as to be consistent with relevant societal themes or, 
in Erikson's (1975) words, "the historical moment". However, all of 
Helms's racial identity models (e.g.,1989, 1990a, 1992, 1995; Helms & 
Piper, 1994) are based on the following underlying common racial-
identity themes: (a) one's racial identity develops in comparison to 
one's "contrast" racial group; (b) healthy identity development in-
volves the abandonment of societal impositions of racial-self in favor 
of one's own personally relevant self-definition; (c) members of all of 
the socioracial groups develop racial identity by means of a sequential 
process in which increasingly more sophisticated differentiations of 
the ego evolve from earlier or less mature statuses; and (d) qualitative 
differences in expression of racial identity statuses can be measured, 
but development must be inferred from responses to measures. 
Helms uses the term ego status to refer to the cognitive-affective 
information-processing strategies (IPS) by which people encode, ana-
lyze, react to, and retrieve racial information. Therefore, statuses in 
her framework are hypothetical constructs. She uses "schema" to 
refer to the observable (and therefore, measurable) manifestations of 
statuses. Thus, existing measures of racial identity can potentially 
assess schema, but not statuses (or stages) . As shown in Tables 2 and 
3, different strategies may underlie each of the schema. Thus, two 
individuals governed by the same status may actually express them-
selves via different information processing strategies. 
The extent to which statuses evolve and consequently, schema 
can be expressed depends, in part, on the versions of racial identity 
expression modeled in the environment as well as the manner in 
which race-related rewards and punishments are dispensed in a 
person's significant (that is, rewarding or punishing) environments. 
Therefore, an adequate measure of racial identity has to incorporate 
such dynamics as they presently occur in the dominant or 
superordinate societal environments in which respondents to such 
measures can be reasonably expected to have been socialized. The 
descriptions of the schema constitute thematic content that is presum-
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Table 2. Black Racial Identity Ego Statuses, Information-Processing Strategy 
(IPS), and Sample Schema Items 
General Principles 
Status I-acceptance of societa lly 
imposed racial characterizations and 
rules for dispensing societal resources. 
IPS: denial, distancing, own-group 
blaming, individualism 
Status 2-Confusion concerning one's 
racial group commitment and ambiv-
alent racial self-definition. 
IPS: disorientation, repression, 
vacillation 
Status 3- ideali zation of one's group 
and use of external standards to define 
oneself, and the contrast group, resi st-
ing outgroup oppressive forces. 
IPS: hypervig ilance, judging, dichot-
omizing, combative 
Status 4-resolving of intrapsychic 
conflict with contrast racial group and 
internali zing of positive racial charac-
teristics. 
IPS: analytic, flexible, intellectual-
izing 
Status 5- questioning, analysis, and 
comparison of racial group status 
re lative to other socioracial groups, 
universal resistance to oppression . 
IPS: probing, restructuring, 
integrating 
Black Statuses 
Conformity (Preencounter)- External 
self-definition which implies devalua-
tion of one's own group, and idealiza-
tion of Whites and White standards of 
merit. 
Sample: "I feel uncomfortable around 
Black people." 
Dissonance (Encounter)- Ambivalence 
and confusion concerning one's role 
relative to one's own racial group and 
the White group. 
Sample- "l feel guilty or anx ious about 
some of the things I believe about Black 
people." 
Immersion!Emersion- idealization of 
one's own racial group, denigration of 
that which is perceived to be White, 
emphasis on group empowerment. 
Sample: "I frequently confront the 
system and the (White) man." 
Internalization-intellectualizing, cap-
acity to objectively assess and respond 
to members of the White group, and use 
of interna l criteria for self-definition . 
Sample: "People regardless of their race 
have strengths and limitations." 
Integrative Awareness (Internalization! 
Commitment)- Capacity to value one's 
own collective identities as well as recog-
nize similarities between oneself and 
other oppressed people. 
Sample: "I involve myself in social ac-
tion and political groups even if there 
are no other Blacks involved." 
Note: The Black racial identit y statuses are li sted in ascend ing order of evolution and 
complexity of express ion, and are adapted from Helms (in press) and Helms and Piper ( 1994). 
4. IDENTITY MEASUREMENT 157 
Table 3 . White Racial Identity Ego Statuses, Information-ProcesSing Stra tegy 
(IPS), and Sample Schema Items. 
General Principles 
Status I- acceptance of societally im-
posed racial characterizations and rules 
for di spensing societal resources. 
IPS: denial , obliviousness, naivete 
Status 2- Confusion concerning one's 
racial group commitment and ambiv-
alent racial self-definition. 
IPS: disorientation, suppression 
Status 3- idealization of one's group 
and use of external standards to de-
fine oneself, and other groups. 
IPS: minimization, selective percep-
tion, outgroup distortion 
Status 4- "good-bad" dichotomi za-
tions of racial groups and imposition 
of owngroup's standards as cond ition 
for acceptance. 
IPS: rationalization, selective percep-
tion 
Status 5- quest ioning, analysis, and 
comparison of racial group status rela-
tive to other groups. 
IPS: hypervigilance, probing, analyzing 
Status 6- self-affirming commitment to 
one's societally assigned racial group; 
flex ible standards for perceiving other 
racial group members. 
White Statuses 
Contact- satisfaction with racial status 
quo, obliviousness to racism and one's 
participation in it. 
Sample: "I wish I had a Black friend ." 
Disintegration- Disorientation caused 
by racial moral dilemmas which force 
one to choose between commitment to 
one's racial group and principles of 
humanity . 
Sample: "I do not feel that I have the 
social ski lls to interact with B lack people 
effectively." 
Reintegration- idealization of one's own 
racial group, denigration of other racial 
groups, championship of own-group 
entitlement. 
Sample: "I get angry when I think about 
how Whites have been treated by 
Blacks." 
Pseudo-Independence- rational ized 
commitment to own racial group and of 
ostensible libera lism toward other groups. 
Sample: "I feel as comfortable around 
Blacks as I do around Whites. " 
Immersion/Emersion- search for an 
understanding of how one benefits from 
and contributes to racism. 
Sample: "I am making a special effort to 
understand the significance of being 
White." 
Autonomy- informed, integrated posi-
ti ve racial-group commitment, use of 
internal standards for self-definition, 
capacity to relinqui sh the privileges of 
racism. 
(continued ... ) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
General Principles 
IPS: integrat ing, intellectualiz ing 
HELMS 
White Statuses 
Sample: "I involve myself in causes 
regard less of the race of the people 
involved in them." 
Note: The White rac ial ident ity statuses are li sted in ascend ing order of evolution and 
complex ity of express ion, and are adapted from Helms (in press) and Helms and Piper (1994). 
ably relevant in contemporary society, but may change as the racial 
zeitgeist changes. 
From Helms's perspective, the racial identity developmental pro-
cess (that is, evolution of statuses) and expression of one's racial 
identity (that is, racial identity schema) are not necessarily synonomous. 
The process defines the sequence by which various racial identity ego 
statuses may become available for influencing behavior as broadly 
defined; expression concerns the race-related quality of the observed 
behavior. One can infer the presence of particular statuses from behavior 
samples (e.g., responses to scale items). Presumably, one cannot use a 
particular schema unless the underlying stahlS has evolved to some 
extent. However, one cannot conclude that any single sample of race-
related behavior necessarily reveals all of the statuses that are potentially 
accessible to the person. Because a status has differentiated to some 
extent in the person's ego (i.e., is present) does not mean it will necessar-
ily govern the person's behavior. Therefore, measures of each schema 
ought to include more than one sample of the behavior intended to 
reflect a particular form of identity expression so that consistency of the 
person's response can be determined. 
Moreover, the rate at which statuses differentiate within indi-
viduals is proposedly determined by each person's own level of 
cognitive-affective maturity in combination with the amount and 
quality of his or her race-related socialization (Helms, 1984). For 
measurement purposes, these idiographic aspects of racial identity 
may be problematic to the extent that one relies on group-level 
measurement principles for developing one's measures without ad-
justing them for person-level characteristics. Be that as it may, in 
general, the statuses (i.e., cognitive-affective information-processing 
strategies) are assumed to evolve in approximately the following 
sequence: (a) adaptation of societal interpetations of one's racial 
group(s) relative to others; (b) confusion and disorientation; (c) ideal-
ized identifying with one's own group; (d) capacity to question 
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societal racial ascriptions with respect to one's own self relative to 
societal socioracial groups, and (e) internalizing of a personally af-
firming racial identity. 
Depending on which socioracial group the person being assessed 
seemingly belongs to, and where the group lies in the sociopolitical 
power hierarchy with respect to these issues, the names given to the 
various statuses of the developmental process and the details of their 
thematic content may differ. 
In Tables 2 and 3, respectively, the Black and White models of 
racial identity are briefly summarized for the purpose of illustrating 
measurement conundrums. More detailed explications can be found 
in Helms (in press, 1992, 1994b, 1995). In Column 1, the contents or 
basic themes of the expressed statuses (i.e., schema) and the cognitive-
. affective information processing strategies (IPS) of the statuses are 
described. Column 2 provides an example of relevant items from the 
respective identity measures. 
Nevertheless, conceptually, the racial identity development process 
is similar. That is, regardless of the person's racial classification, the 
capacity to respond to racial stimuli in one's environment involves 
multiple intrapsychic processes that differ in the complexity of reactions 
to racial environmental catalysts they can generate. The process within 
the United States is "universal" because racial classification is omnipres-
ent in this country, but aspects of the content of the process may be 
unique to groups as well as to individuals within the groups. Moreover, 
content may change as society changes its manner of socializing racial 
groups, but the process of developing racial identity should persist as 
long as socioracial groups are differentially valued by the society. 
Black and (People of Color) Identity. In actuality, the process of racial 
identity development for Blacks is not incongruent with that of other 
disenfranchised groups of color in many respects. In fact, Atkinson et 
al. (1989) developed a general conceptual model of oppression to 
reflect their belief that" oppressed-group" identity, that is, for groups 
socialized under similar conditions of racial discrimination and op-
pression, healthy identity development requires that they resolve 
similar identity conflicts within themselves. 
Thus, many of the theoretical issues raised with respect to Black 
Americans' racial identity development and expression also pertain 
to other groups of color. Furthermore, concerns related to the mea-
surement of their racial identity should pertain to various VREGs to 
the extent that the other groups have been socialized under similar . 
conditions of cross-generational racial oppression, and the measure 
purports to assess intrapsychic reactions to such oppression. 
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Consequently, if one is a member of the less empowered groups, 
then one's primary racial (social) identity issue is to overcome the 
internalized negative stereotyping associated with membership in 
such groups in order to avoid permanent psychic wounding and to 
form curative bonds with one's own group members. Because Blacks 
are a numerical and sociopolitical minority in American society, it is 
virtually impossible for them to exist without encountering society's 
pro-White/ anti-Black socialization in some form. Therefore, it seems 
conceivable that more Blacks than not will have developed complex 
racial information-processing strategies at early ages because their 
psychological and social survival requires such adaptation. 
Table 2 summarizes the basic characteristics of the ego statuses 
hypothesized to typify the racial identity developmental process for 
Black Americans. It should be noted that Helms (Helms, 1984; Helms 
& Parham, cited in Parham & Helms, 1981) originally used Cross's 
labels for the racial identity stages (now called statuses) and related 
subscales. However, to conform to her subsequent revisions of her 
conceptual models (Helms, 1995; Helms & Cook, in press), she rela-
beled the subscales by using a combination of Atkinson et al.'s (1989) 
and Cross's (1971) labels. The amalgamated labels are intended to 
reflect more accurately the dynamic developmental processes under-
lying the subscale measures. Thus, in Table 2, labels in parentheses 
are Cross's original names of the statuses where applicable. 
White Racial Identity. If one is a member of the dominative group, 
one's primary racial identity issues are to (a) overcome the entitled 
stereotyping associated with membership in the White group, and (b) 
learn to appreciate one's group and oneself as a member of the White 
socioracial group without colluding with other group members in com-
mandeering societal resources. Moreover, because a White person expe-
riences majority status because he or she is a member of the White group, 
then the person does not have to cope with resolving issues of racial 
identity development unless he or she finds himself or herself in a 
personally relevant situation(s) that challenges his or her entitled status, 
and from which he or she cannot conveniently escape (Helms, 1984). In 
other words, if it is true that the majority of Whites do not have to 
contemplate their racial identity very much, then it is likely that any 
randomly chosen group is likely to interpret racial stimuli (e.g., race-
related measure items) simplistically. Moreover, even individuals who 
might be predisposed to process and respond to information by means 
of cognitively and affectively complex statuses, might not be able to do 
so if White role models who can exhibit complex racial responses are not 
present in their socialization environments. 
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Implications. Perhaps it is evident from the summaries in Table 2 
and 3 that major measurement dilemmas with respect to Black and 
White racial identity occur because each status may be expressed by 
means of one of several dynamic nonlinear processes. Each of the 
processes occurs in response to the three core components of racial 
identity: individual, intragroup, and intergroup. These core dimen-
sions are defined as follows: (a) intrapsychic or personal cognitive-
affective maturation processes, the extent to which a person is capable 
of processing racial information; (b) the manner of internalizing one's 
own-(racial) group affiliation (i.e., inward representations of societal 
messages about one's ascribed racial group as communicated by 
significant members of that group); and (c) the internalizing of out-
group relations, intrapychic evaluations of the contrast group (e.g., 
Whites for Blacks) relative to one's own socioracial group. 
Each of the dimensions may covary in opposite directions. Thus, 
for example, when a person's reactions are being directed by the 
Conformity (Preencounter) status, he or she may function by concep-
tualizing himself or herself as an individual rather than as a member 
of a group. Also, such a person presumably uses internalized nega-
tive stereotyping pertaining to his or her racial group to encode, 
interpret, and react to racial stimuli pertaining to her or his own 
group; but uses unrealistically positive internalized stereotyping to 
process racial information pertaining to Whites. 
Therefore, a measure of a particular schema (i.e., manner of 
expressing statuses) should incorporate all three dimensions, indi-
vidual characteristics, owngroup affiliation, and outgroup relations. 
This assertion does not mean that every item or behavior sample 
within a relevant measure should include all three dimensions, but 
rather that the collection of items or behavior samples should be at 
least tri-dimensional. Relatedly, the owngroup-outgroup or racial 
elements of each status may be inversely related (i.e., function in 
opposite directions), positively related (i.e., function in the same 
directions), or not be related at all. For example, the Dissonance 
(Encounter) and Disintegration statuses describe a person who is 
being pulled in contradictory directions, toward his or her own group 
as well as toward the out group. Consequently, an adequate measure 
of racial identity ought to include the tension of racial-group dynam-
ics as a defining dimension. 
A measurement implication of the observations concerning the 
potential tenuousness of White identity development and the virtu-
ally mandatory nature of Black identity development pertains to the 
possibility that White and Black identity when examined on a group 
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level, may be skewed in opposite directions for the two groups. The 
more-or-less voluntary nature of White identity development means 
that the population of White people should express racial identity 
skewed in the direction of less mature identity statuses (positively 
skewed). On the other hand, the more-or-less mandatory racial 
identity development of Black people means the population with 
respect to racial identity reactions should be skewed toward more 
complex statuses (negatively skewed). 
It has been argued (Brown & Gore, 1994; Nunnally, 1978) that a 
measure is more capable of differentiating among individuals if the 
distribution of scores w1derlying the measure is symmetrical (and 
preferably normal). Therefore, depending upon the severity of the 
skewness, it may be difficult to differentiate among individuals with 
low scores when a measure's distribution of scores is positively 
skewed, and among individuals with high scores when a measure's 
distribution is negatively skewed. Moreover, it might be difficult to 
develop racial identity measures or to investigate the psychometric 
properties of existing measures without selecting one's sample to 
compensate for potential skewnesses within the population under 
investigation. 
Ethnic Identity 
The informal notion of an internalized ethnic identity as a phe-
nomenon that is influenced by a person's connectedness and interac-
tions with primary social groups has been around at least since Freud 
(1959) proposed his own irresistable "attraction" to "Jewry and Jews" 
as an explanation for his intellectual accomplishments. Perhaps Freud 
also provided the initial first-person description of the psychological 
experience of possessing a collective identity. Here, collective identity 
refers to a person's internalized ascribed (societally determined) or 
achieved (earned) membership in social categories (e.g., racial classi-
fication, ethnic classification, gender). 
Thus, Freud, who described himself as a life-long "unbeliever" 
and a man "without any religion," is quoted as having described his 
Jewish identity as follows: "[My Jewish identity consisted of] many 
obscure emotional forces, which were the more powerful the less they 
could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner 
identity, the safe privacy of a common mental construction .... [And 
b ]ecause I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which 
restricted others in the use of their intellect; and as a Jew I was 
prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the 
'compact majority'" (cited in Erikson, 1976, p . 62, italics added). 
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Thus, from Freud's revelation, it becomes clear that as is the case 
for racial identity, ethnic identity can also be a nebulous motivational 
force that functions at the individual or person level. He also raised 
the notion of ethnic identity as a "mental construCtion," which pre-
sumably distinguishes it from an objective reality. However, in this 
paper, it is contended that the motivational force for ethnic identity. 
which distinguishes it from racial identity, is cultural in nature, and 
need not necessarily be "Oppositional." In fact, to be consistent, 
theories and measures are discussed as ethnic in focus if they incor-
porate group-specific culture in more than a superficial (e.g., self or 
theorist designation) manner, and racial if they only deal with the 
dynamics of in-group /outgroup opposition and conflict. 
This definitional strategy excludes those theoretical models that 
purport to be etluuc identity models, but only deal with ethnicity in 
comparison to other racial (rather than ethnic) groups; or-perhaps 
more accurately-includes such models under the racial identity 
rubric. However, it includes identity (sometimes called acculturation) 
models that propose different styles of cultural adaptation based on 
inevitable metacultural acculturative or assimilative pressures toward 
conformity (e.g., Aboud, 1987; Aboud & Skerry, 1984). The definition 
also includes models that attempt to describe ethnic-group cultural 
affiliation or lack thereof (e.g., Bernal et al., 1990). Several measures 
have been developed to assess etlmic cultural characteristics for 
various ethnic groups. Therefore, it is probably useful to summarize 
some of the basic tenets of the cultural adaptation and group-affilia-
tion perspectives. 
Cultural Adaptation. Several theorists have conceptualized ethnic 
identity as cultural styles or patterns that groups evolve in response 
to meta cultural pressures to relinguish traditional cultures (e.g., Aboud 
& Skerry, 1984; Birman, 1994; Bulhan, 1980; Ruiz & Padilla, 1977; 
Szapocznik, Scopetta, Kurtines, & Aranalde, 1978; Stone quist, 1937; 
Tajfel, 1978). Many of them propose some combination of the follow-
ing patterns: (a) moving away from or relinquishment of one's tradi-
tional (ethnic) culture, (b) moving towards or internalizing the 
metaculture, (c) rejection of both the etluuc culture and the metaculture, 
and (d) moving towards or internalizing both cultures (i.e., 
biculturality). Thus, these conceptualizations attempt to describe 
differential levels of cOlmectedness with one's etlmic group as well as 
the metaculture. The basic measurement task with respect to these 
models is to differentiate among the proposed styles. 
Ethnic Group Affiliation. According to Bernal et al. (1990), ethnic 
identity consists of the following five components: (a) ethnic self-
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identification, defined as involving self-categorization and labeling of 
oneself as a member of the ethnic group based on "appropriate 
[ingroup] cues"; (b) ethnic constancy, awareness that "one's ethnic 
characteristics are unchanging and permanent" (p. 5); (c) performance 
of ethnic role behaviors, not necessarily knowledgeable use of a wide 
range of ethnic behaviors, values, customs, and so forth; (d) ethnic 
knowledge, awareness of the content (e.g., customs, behaviors, etc.) of 
the relevant ethnic culture; and (e) ethnic preferences and feelings, 
attraction toward one's ethnic group and the culture that defines the 
group. 
This perspective does not propose specific interrelationships 
among the various components. Nor does it specify an ordering or 
sequencing of components as does racial identity developmental 
theory. However, Bernal et al. (1990) do speculate that children 
become more adept at each of the components as they age, presum-
ably because ethnic identification is based on conceptual cues that are 
more subtle and, therefore, more difficult to recognize than is true of 
racial identity. Consequently, for measurement purposes, it does not 
appear that it is necessary for any single measure to evaluate all of the 
proposed components, although for pragmatic purposes, presumably 
each of them should be capable of being measured or assessed in 
some manner. 
MEASUREMENT OF ETHNIC AND RACIAL IDENTITY 
In the measurement literature, race and ethnicity generally are 
used interchangeably. Thus, it is often difficult to determine which 
construct researchers iJ1.tend to quantify. Nevertheless, in general, it 
appears that both ethnic identity and racial identity have been mea-
sured most frequently by means of various kinds of paper-and-pencil 
rating scales. However, several researchers have advised that mea-
surement of racial or ethnic identity would be improved by focusing 
upon the respondents' subjective experiences of race or culture, but 
not both in a single measure (e.g., Alba, 1990; Landrine & Klonoff, 
1994). Such a differential focus would make it easier to identify 
measurement dilemmas that are peculiar to one form of collective 
identity rather than the other. 
Measures of Ethnic Identity 
In the identity conceptual and measurement literature, sometimes 
ethnic identity measures are called ethnic identity measures, and 
sometimes they are called acculturation measures. For the purposes of 
this paper, the mitigating factors that define a measure as an ethnic 
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identity measure are that it (a) addresses some aspect of culture as 
defined by adaptation to a group's culture or self-reported kinship 
with a cultural group, (b) includes the person's subjective experience 
of culture or acculturation in some manner, and (c) that one's specific 
cultural rather than socioracial group be a central aspect of the 
measurement process. 
Three categories of ethnic identity measures were gleaned from 
Atkinson and Thompson's (1992) review of racial and cultural vari-
ables in counseling. They are unidimensional, componential, and 
bicultural. Unidimensional scales measure the person's acquisition of 
the meta culture (e.g., Cuellar, Harris, & Jasso, 1980); componential 
scales measure the extent to which a person expresses various compo-
nents (e.g., language, kinship) of her or his traditional culture (e.g., 
Bernal et al., 1990; Padilla, 1980); and bicultural scales measure the 
person's level of acclimation to the metaculture and her or his tradi-
tional culture (Szapocznik et al., 1978). 
The theoretical model underlying most of these measures is either 
cultural adaptation or a combination of kinship and cultural adapta-
tion. An example of a unidimensional combination scale is Cuellar et 
al.'s (1980) Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans 
(ARSMA). Respondents use 20 multiple-choice items to describe 
themselves with respect to (a) Spanish language facility, (b) owngroup 
interaction, (c) ethnic self-designation, and (d) competence in Anglo 
culture. Cutoff scores are used to assign respondents to one of three 
to five categories (very Mexican, Mexican-oriented bicultural, true 
bicultural, etc.). Several measures for other ethnic groups have been 
adapted from the ARSMA (e.g., Suinn, Rickard-Figueroa, Lew, & 
Vigil, 1987). 
As PhiImey (1990) noted, often iIwestigators have not described 
the psychometric characteristics of their measures or they have relied 
on the measure originator's psychometric descriptions. Nevertheless, 
Kunkel (1990) reported a Cronbach's alpha of .92 for the ARSMA, and 
SuiIm et" al. (1987) reported an alpha coefficient of .88 for their Asian 
adaptation, the SL-ASIA. Such results suggest that measures of etlmic 
identity can be constructed in which items are highly interrelated and, 
perhaps, are homogeneous. 
Measures of Racial Identity 
In their review of measures of racial identity, Burlew and Smith 
(1991) classified such measures as follows: (a) developmental, focus 
on intrapsychic and/or psychosocial adaptations to social and envi-
ronmental forces of race and racism; (b) Africentric, examine manifes-
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tations of African-oriented personality characteristics; (c) group based, 
emphasize level of affiliation or kinship with a racial group; and (d) 
racial stereotyping, evaluate the extent to which societal racial stereo-
types have been internalized. Most of the racial identity measures 
have had Black people as their focus. The racial identity measures 
developed by Helms and her associates (e.g., Helms & Parham, 1985; 
Helms & Carter, 1990) are direct descendants of the developmental 
approaches of measuring racial identity (e.g., Cross, 1971). 
Description. Both the Black and White racial identity measures have 
similar measurement dilemmas to be resolved because they are based on 
analogous theoretical frameworks (see Tables 2 and 3). Consequently, 
the subsequent observations about the psychometric properties of such 
measures and recommendations for resolving some of the measurement 
and assessment concerns generally pertain to both the Black (BRIAS) and 
White (WRIAS) racial identity scales, although the WRIAS will generally 
be used to illush'ate relevant points. 
Both identity scales are rationally constructed personality mea-
sures intended to quantify the level of implementation (that is, expres-
sion) of the relevant racial identity ego statuses. Because the subscales 
of the measures are intended to reflect the constructs of racial identity 
theory, they are intended to be multidimensional in nature. That is, 
each subscale in its entirety is intended to quantify the manner in 
which the respondent reacts to racial information about self relative to 
his or her own racial group as well as the relevant contrast group as 
previously discussed. Respondents use 5-point Likert scales (l=Strongly 
Disagree to 5=Strongly Agree) to respond to items similar to those 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. Primacy or strengths of schema usage are 
inferred from a person's racial identity subscale scores (i.e., higher 
scores imply stronger or more dominant schema). 
The racial identity measures have face validity as attitudinal mea-
sures and were originally conceived as such. However, some evidence 
supports the conclusion that the items comprising the measure elicit 
individual interpretations of racial stimuli rather than objectively report-
able attitudes or opinions. The evidence includes (a) respondents' 
unsolicited written interpretations of and perhaps reactions to WRIAS 
items (Remy, 1993), (b) the lack of substantial relationships between 
racial identity sub scale scores and measures of social desirability (e.g., 
Meijer, 1993), and (c) the fluidity of racial identity subscale scores under 
conditions of racial stimulation (Corbett, 1994; Meijer, 1993). 
Remy (1993) summarized her respondents' unsolicited written 
responses to WRIAS items. She noted that most of her sample either 
agreed or disagreed with the Contact item, "I wish I had a Black friend," 
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as intended. However, a small (unspecified) percentage of her sample 
responded by reporting that they had a Black friend and chastising the 
researcher for accusing them of racism. Hacker (1992) contends that such 
testifying is typical for most White "liberals" because having a Black 
friend is evidence to themselves and others that they are not racists. 
Additionally, Remy found a variety of idiosyncratic responses to other 
items including drawn swastikas, musings about how Blacks might 
respond to the items, explanations of why the person answered as he or 
she did, and so forth. Interestingly, individualistic interpretations of 
items were even more evident on scales in which Remy replaced 
"Blacks" with "Asian Americans" in item stems. 
Some evidence suggests that racial identity expressions may not 
be related to standard measures of social desirability on a group level 
(Meijer, 1993). The correlations shown in the diagonal of Table 6 
indicate negligible correlations between the racial identity subscales 
and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Marlowe & 
Crowne, 1961), a standard measure of a social desirability response 
set. The sample on which the correlational analyses were conducted 
are from Helms and Carter (1991). Meijer also found negligible 
correlations ranging from -.16 (Disintegration and Reintegration) to 
.11 (Autonomy) for her sample of 243. 
It is at least conceivable that for subscales to have strong social 
desirability response sets, items would need a recognizable positive 
direction. However, racial identity theory postulates that the social 
desirability of items is determined by the status the person uses in 
processing them. 
Meijer (1993) and Corbett (1994) investigated environmental and 
intrapsychic conditions under which scores on WRIAS subscales 
vary. Meier investigated changes in psychology students' WRIAS 
subscale scores over a 12-week interval during which the experimen-
tal group was exposed to an introductory psychology course with a 
multicultural emphasis. She found that none of the racial identity 
expression subscale scores changed significantly except Pseudo-Inde-
pendence, which decreased by the end of the interval regardless of 
whether respondents had participated in the course. Thus, her 
findings suggest that under normal circumstances, racial identity 
expressions measured at a group level are quite stable over time. 
Corbett (1994) found that those respondents who were exposed to 
a role-reversal racial fantasy rather than a career fantasy expressed 
lower levels of Contact and Pseudo-Independence and higher levels 
of Disintegration, Reintegration, and Immersion/Emersion. More-
over, their racial identity expressions following the race fantasy were 
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more predictive of dimensions of healthy and defensive narcissism 
than they were prior to the fantasy in directions consistent with racial 
identity and narcissism theories. Thus, Corbett's results support 
Helms's contention that racial identity expressions can be stimulated 
by external racial catalysts. 
Consequently, when used at the group level, racial identity mea-
sures at best evaluate common reactions to the racial catalysts con-
tained within items. However, in the absence of information about 
the particular racial socialization experiences of the respondents, it is 
not clear what subscale scores mean for or about a person's racial 
identity expressions at the individual level. 
MEASUREMENT ISSUES AT THE GROUP LEVEL 
Several explorations of the psychometric properties of the racial 
identity research scales have appeared in the counseling literature 
(e.g., Helms & Carter, 1990; Ponterotto & Wise, 1989; Swanson, Tokar, 
& Davis, 1994; Yanico, Swanson, & Tokar, 1994). Moreover, virtually 
all of the studies of other personality constructs thought to be related 
to racial identity schema also have included investigations of the 
psychometric properties of the measures to some extent (e.g., Watts & 
Carter, 1991; Ottavi et al., 1994), and investigators have deleted 
subscales on the basis of the results of these local analyses. Although 
investigators typically have not said so, "classical" measurement 
theory apparently has been the conceptual measurement model on 
which the psychometric explorations of racial identity measures have 
been based. 
In classical measurement theory (i.e., "strong true score" theory), a 
basic measurement assumption is that every observed score (X) presum-
ably arises from one of two sources, true score (T) or error (E). This 
relationship is commonly symbolized by the formula X = T + E. Because 
the value of T (the amount of the construct being measured) cannot be 
measured or observed directly, it is inferred from relationships among Xs 
(i.e., items, test scores, etc.). A number of other measurement assump-
tions follow from the basic h'ue-score premise. DeVellis (1991) summa-
rizes some of the consequent assumptions as follows: 
1. The amount of error associated with individual items varies 
randomly. The error associated with individual items has a 
mean of zero when aggregated across a large number of 
people. Thus, items' means tend to be unaffected by error 
when a large number of respondents complete the items. 
2. One item's error term is not correlated with another item's 
_ error term; the only routes linking items pass through the 
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latent variable [i.e., the true score variance], never through 
any error term. 
3. Error terms are not correlated with the true score. (p. 17). 
Thus, the assumptions imply that obtained interrelationships 
(typically expressed as correlations) among items indicate the amount 
of true score (e.g., racial identity) being measured rather than the 
amount of error. The use of correlations to indicate the amount of true 
score manifested in a set of items also assumes that items (or rather 
the true variance present in such items) are linearly related. However, 
there are several reasons why these basic tenets of classical measure-
ment theory probably are not directly applicable to measurement of 
racial identity schema. The groundwork for most of these arguments 
appeared in prior sections, but it might be necessary to state the 
reasons more explicitly. They are as follows: (a) Racial identity theory 
is a description of how people process racial information at an 
individual level. Although the classical-measurement assumptions 
may be used effectively to obtain descriptive statistics for an entire 
group, they cannot be used to determine T and E exactly for any 
individual. (b) Individual differences in responding to the racial 
identity items are the essence of the theory, but would be considered 
error under the general assumptions previously cited (see Lyman, 
1978). (c) Individual reactions (e.g., person-environment reactivity) to 
racial identity items are not proposed to be linear and consequently, 
relationships among items might be underestimated if one uses 
w1adjusted linear methodologies to evaluate such relationships. These 
sources of incongruence between racial identity theory and the cited 
classical measurement assumptions also may bear on other aspects of 
the psychometric properties of racial identity measures. 
Most efforts to evaluate the psychometric properties of racial iden-
tity measures have been studies of the reliability and/ or internal struc-
ture of the measures. In these investigations, researchers have tended to 
treat racial identity subscales as though they were intended to be linear 
group-level measures, and have evaluated their psychometric properties 
on the basis of strict conformance to the principles of classical measure-
ment theory as previously summarized. Consequently, the interpreta-
tions of the results obtained from such studies have contributed to the 
confusion regarding measurement of racial identity constructs. 
Reliability 
Conceptually, reliability historically has been defined as the cor-
relation between parallel tests (DeVellis, 1991; Graham & Lilly, 1984; 
Nunnally, 1978). In this case, "tests" can be interpreted to mean items 
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within subscales that are intended to measure the same process (i.e., 
racial identity schema). Thus, when measures are developed with 
classical measurement theory as their underlying measurement model, 
reliability coefficients describe the degree of linear interrelationship(s) 
among tests (or items). 
In her critique of racial and ethnic identity measures, Phim1ey 
(1990) noted that reliability with respect to such measures typically is 
not reported or "is low enough to raise questions about conclusions 
based on the measure" (p. 506). Furthermore, she noted that Cronbach's 
alphas were the reliability coefficients usually reported by the 20% of 
studies she reviewed in which reliability was reported. For the 
various measures, she indicated that reported reliabilities have ranged 
from .35 to .90. 
However, Helms's (e.g., Parham & Helms, 1981) Black racial 
identity inventory was the only measure specifically mentioned, and 
for this measure, Phinney (1990) cited alphas ranging from .66 to .72. 
Researchers subsequent to her review have reported alpha reliabilities 
ranging from .45 to .63 for the BRIAS (Yanico et al., 1994). For the 
WRIAS, the following ranges have been reported : .55 to .82 (Helms & 
Carter, 1990); .43 to .85 (Regan, 1992), .18 to .75 (Ottavi et al., 1994), 
and .61 to .84 (Tokar & Swanson, 1991; Swanson et al., 1994). In Table 
4, Cronbach's (1951) coefficient alpha estimates of internal consistency 
reliability are reported for the WRIAS subscales corresponding to the 
schema described in Table 3. The range is from .54 to .79. 
Table 4 . Summary of Psychometric Properties of the WRIAS. 
Scale /"xx Mean SD Range 
Contact .54 3 1.03 4.70 13--44 
Disintegration .76 24.38 5.45 10- 39 
Rei ntegration .79 24.33 5.99 11--46 
Pseudo Independence .62 35.38 4.72 13--47 
Autonomy .67 34.94 4.94 16--48 
Total .37 149.35 10.54 106- 182 
Nole. rXX = coefficient alpha estimates. 
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Ordinarily, in constructing personality measures, internal consis-
tency reliability is a primary issue. Nevertheless, the range of internal 
consistencies of subscales of well-established general identity inven-
tories is quite variable. For example, in their analysis of the psycho-
metric properties of seven well-known identity measures, Walsh and 
Betz (1985) reported internal consistency reliabilities in the .50s and 
.60s for the stages of Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT), a 
measure of moral development; and reliabilities ranging from .45 to 
.78 for the Student Development Task Inventory-2 (SDTI-2; Winston, 
Miller, & Prince, 1979), a measure of Chickering's developmental 
vectors. Of the published identity measures the authors described, the 
DIT and the SDTI-2 were the only two by which the quality of 
respondents' psychosocial identity statuses is inferred from objec-
tively scored scales rather than rater-scoring procedures. 
Examination of the alpha coefficients shown in Table 4 reveals 
that they are not great if one uses cognitive ability tests as the 
standard, but that they are not bad in comparison to psychosocial 
identity inventories. Typically, low racial identity alpha coefficients 
have been interpreted to mean a lack of homogeneity among items or 
the presence of heterogeneity (e.g., Yanico et al., 1994). Yet at least a 
couple of other explanations are possible, particularly when one 
considers the variability of reported alphas across studies and (pre-
sumably) research sites. 
An obvious explanation is that researchers may not have sampled 
adequately. In order to obtain high coefficient alphas, one needs to 
have some people who have high scores relative to some people who 
have low scores. If the distributions of racial identity statuses within 
populations are skewed, then one may need to do special sampling to 
include people who can express the under-represented statuses. Thus, 
for example, one might need to find White people who are civil rights 
activists to represent adequately the higher end of the Autonomy 
subscale. Most researchers to date have used convenience and/or 
regional samples, but have not selected samples who might reason-
ably be expected to be capable of expressing the schema under 
investigation. 
Furthermore, under the best of circumstances, Cronbach's (1951) 
alpha coefficient estimates the degree of interrelationship among a set 
of items rather than the degree of homogeneity of scales or subscales 
(Green, Lissitz, & Mulaik, 1977). However, Green et al. note that 
alpha coefficients may underestimate the interrelatedness of items 
under the following conditions: (a) if items' true scores are related to 
one another in nonlinear ways that cannot be revealed by a correlation 
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matrix and/ or (b) items are negatively related to one another. Also, if 
situational variables interact with the characteristics of the person 
rather than being a form of random variance, then coefficient alpha 
might also underestimate the reliability of measures. 
Ordinarily, the recommended tedmiques for analyzing the reliabil-
ity of multifactorial scales have been split-half, alternate forms, or imme-
diate test-retest (Cureton, 1967; Dawis, 1987). However, most of these 
approaches are not entirely workable for establishing the reliability of 
racial identity measures for a variety of reasons. Alternate form reliabil-
ity will not function as a reliability-estimating approach because none of 
the racial identity measures has an alternate form. Immediate test-retest 
reliability should reveal that subscale responses are stable over short 
periods of time given Meijer's (1993) and Corbett's (1994) findings of 
stability over extended periods of time. However, although test-retest 
would reveal whether the processes were stable over short periods of 
time, it is not apparent that such procedures would reveal much about 
the structure of items within subscales, which presumably is the question 
that motivates researchers who use coefficient alpha. 
Of the recommended alternative reliability procedures, split-half 
potentially can be adapted for assessing item structure by means of 
linear analysis. However, one would need to use what DeVellis 
(1991) calls "balanced" halves rather than the customary splitting 
(e.g., random, odd-even) procedures. When using a balancing proce-
dure, halves are chosen so that items indicative of relevant item 
characteristics or principles are present in both halves. Thus, for 
example, in the present case, one might select halves according to the 
information-processing strategies being tapped by items, so that the 
strategies are equivalently represented in both halves. To date, 
balanced split-halves have not been used to evaluate the reliability of 
the racial identity subscales. 
Be that as it may, due to low alpha coefficients, editors have 
forced researchers (e.g., Watts & Carter, 1991) to eliminate certain 
scales from their research as a condition for publication (Carter, 
personal communication). The editors contend that it is impossible to 
know what a scale is measuring if its coefficient alpha is low. How-
ever, given the virtual dearth of racial identity measures with a 
substantial history of psychometric exploration, reliance on coeffi-
cient alpha as the sole indicator of the interrelatedness of items is 
probably premature when the possible limitations of this approach 
for evaluating the reliability of racial identity measures is considered. 
In addition, although sample size does generally affect the size of 
reliability coefficients, smaller reliability coefficients can be used to 
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describe accurately the responses of large groups relative to small 
groups or individuals. Thus, for example, Thorndike and Hagen 
(1969) can be used to illustrate this point. They compared changes 
over two occasions in the rank ordering of two people's, small groups' 
(N = 25), and large groups' (N = 100) scores, when the initial scores 
placed one person or group at the 50th percentile and the other's score 
placed the person or group at the 75th percentile. They calculated that 
a reliability coefficient of .50 would result in inconsistent descriptions 
(i.e., a reversal in rank order) about 36.8% of the time for two people, 
whereas the same size coefficient would result in inconsistent descrip-
tions of 100-person groups 1 in 2,500 (.04%) times. 
It seems reasonable to infer from Thorndike and Hagen's dis-
course that if one uses the criteria of state-of-the-art and sample size, 
then even the racial identity subscale with the lowest internal consis-
tency reliability coefficient (Contact= .54) shown in Table 4 should be 
suitable for describing the rank order of groups of 100 or more most 
of the time and smaller samples almost two-thirds of the time. Thus, 
for virtually all of the racial identity studies intended to examine the 
reliability or validity of the racial identity measures (e.g., Tokar & 
Swanson, 1991; Ottavi & Pope-Davis, 1994; Swanson et al., 1994), the 
reported internal consistency reliabilities have been adequate for 
describing groups according to Thorndike and Hagen's criteria, re-
searchers' admonitions notwithstanding. 
Thus, in the construct-validity literature pertaining to racial iden-
tity measures (e.g., Ottavi et al., 1994; Tokar & Swanson, 1991; Watts 
& Carter, 1991), alpha coefficients were used primarily to describe the 
subscale responses of samples of at least 100 persons. For example, 
even Tokar and Swanson (1991; Swanson et al., 1994), who contend 
that their studies demonstrate the inadequate psychometric proper-
ties of racial identity measures, used a sample consisting of 309 
college students. The alpha coefficients that they obtained were 
adequate for the group-level statistics that they performed (multiple 
regressions) according to Thorndike and Hagen's criteria despite 
Tokar and Swanson's protestations to the contrary. 
Of course, one should attempt to construct highly reliable mea-
sures, but the procedures for determining reliability should be consis-
tent with the conceptual model on which the measure is based. 
Moreover, reliability should not repl~ce validity as the indicator of a 
measure's psychometric merits (Ebel, 1961; Thorndike & Hagen, 
1969). In those instances in which researchers obtain low alpha 
reliability coefficients, they should perhaps use their findings as a 
catalyst for considering alternative measurement models, or reconsid-
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ering the manner in which their data were collected. Moreover, low 
subscale coefficient alphas combined with evidence of subscale valid-
ity (e.g., significant correlations between the subscales and measures 
external to the identity measures) should serve as an additional 
catalyst for considering the applicability of one's measurement model 
and/ or sampling procedures. 
Scale Correlations 
Various researchers have also used subscale intercorrelations to 
investigate the internal structure of racial identity measures (Ottavi et 
al., 1994; Swanson et al., 1994; Yanico et al., 1994). In general, 
subscales developmentally contiguous to one another should be cor-
related without being completely overlapping. Investigators of the 
construct validity of the subscales who use multiple regression to 
predict other personality variables from racial identity have been 
particularly concerned when moderately to highly correlated scales 
do not each predict the variables of interest as expected. 
In this regard, Tokar and Swanson (1991) fow1d a correlation of .66 
between the Pseudo Independence (alpha=.65) and Autonomy (alpha = 
.71) subscales of the WRIAS. In regression analyses, they found that 
when Pseudo Independence was used as one of five predictors, it did not 
W1iquely predict any of their criterion measures, but Autonomy signifi-
cantly predicted llmer-directedness or self-acceptance. From such find-
ings, they concluded that "some of the [racial identity] subscale 
intercorrelations were so high as to suggest redw1dancy" (p. 299). 
Although conclusions concerning redundancy of the subscales 
are at least debatable, it is also the case that ll1 the absence of 
correlations of 1.00, correlations may not reveal much about how 
individuals within the sample respond. In Table 7, the subscales with 
the correlation between them closest to Tokar and Swanson's "redun-
dant" correlation are Autonomy and Pseudo Independence (1' = .66). 
Table 6 shows that most of the sample (93.5%) uses both of the two 
schema in statistically equivalent levels, but that approximately 4% 
uses Autonomy more and approximately 3% uses Pseudo Indepen-
dence more. Of the two statuses, Autonomy is the more complex 
cognitively and affectively. Thus, at best a high intersubscale corre-
lation can suggest the extent to which a sample uses two schemata, 
but it cannot reveal the ordering of the expressions within the sample. 
Factor Analyses 
In addition to Cronbach's alpha, exploratory factor analyses have 
also been used to examine the internal structure of the racial identity 
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measures at an item level (Ponterotto & Wise, 1989; Swanson et al., 
1994; Yanico et al., 1994). However, three reasons why standard 
factor analysis may not be the best analytic strategy for investigating 
Helms and her associates' (Helms & Parham, 1985; Helms & Carter, 
1990) subscale items are as follows: (a) Neither racial identity subscales 
nor racial identity measures in their entirety are intended to be 
homogeneous or unidimensional; (b) the assumption of linear rela-
tionships between variables in factor analysis frequently results in a 
large number of dimensions (Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 1981); 
. and (c) standard factor analysis cannot reveal the ordering (that is, the 
increasing complexity) of subscales or items within subscales. 
In addition, most of the aforementioned problems have been 
exaggerated because contemporary researchers have performed their 
analyses on the entire scales rather than the individual subscales. 
With respect to linear relationships, researchers (e.g., Ponterotto & 
Wise, 1987) have reported that items reflective of transitional pro-
cesses (e.g., Dissonance/Encounter) load on the same factors as the 
items of one or the other adjacent subscales. The general aim of such 
items is to pull the person in opposing directions. However, in factor 
analysis, items tend to be "attracted" to the subscale items with which 
they share the strongest linear relationships, even if those relation-
ships are not very strong. However, such findings do not necessarily 
mean that nonlinear dimensions could not account for more variance, 
particularly if the items were analyzed within the context of their 
separate subscale. 
Prochaska, DiClemente, and Norcross (1992) encountered the 
same problem with respect to continuous items intended to measure 
a transitional or preparatory stage of mastering addictive disorders. 
That is, the transitional items disappeared as a separate subscale 
when principal components analyses were used to examine the con-
struct validity of their measure. They noted that abandonment of 
their preparatory stage in compliance with the factor analyses led 
them to disregard an important aspect of their population's behavior. 
Consequently they recommended that cluster analyses be used to find 
the transitional stage because such analytic procedures did consis-
tently reveal individuals who could be classified as transitional. 
Cluster analytic approaches might be more appropriate than standard 
factor analysis for racial identity measures as well. 
Also, the concept of ordering as it is used in racial identity theory 
may be inadequately assessed by standard factor analysis. Some of 
the various racial identity information-processing strategies are su-
perficially similar in content, but not in function. For example, the 
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denial of Contact is similar to the rationalization of Pseudo Indepen-
dence. Consequently, it would not be surprising to find denial and 
rationalization items loading on the same factors. Yet clinicians 
generally consider rationalization to be a more complex mode of 
reacting than denial. Standard factor analysis cannot reveal this type 
of differential complexity. 
Implications. Much of the existing literature supports the need for 
alternative strategies for examining the psychometric properties of 
racial identity scales that purport to be measures involving human 
judgment or perceptual processes (i.e., process measures). One set of 
approaches that has not received much attention in the relevant 
literature, but might be useful in managing the problems of nonlinearity 
and ordering of items within subscales is multidimensional scaling 
(e.g., Schiffman et al., 1981). Basically, multidimensional scaling is a 
statistical approach that allows one to discover the configurations 
among items as subjects perceive them. 
Helms (1990) tried group-level multidimensional scaling to study 
the psychometric properties of the first 30 items of the BRIAS. She 
abandoned such efforts for pragmatic reasons (i.e., it was not clear 
that such approaches could be easily used by practitioners to assess 
individuals). Nevertheless, she found that four theoretically consis-
tent dimensions accounted for 89% of the variance among items, 
whereas with four factors, Yanico et al. (1994) could only account for 
about 20% of the variance among the same items using factor analysis. 
Thus, this technique seems worthy of further investigation. More-
over, computer programs are now more widely available for perform-
ing multidimensional scaling on a person level than they were when 
Helms first tried the technique for studying racial identity rating-scale 
measures. 
Assessment Issues 
Neither the racial identity nor the ethnic identity measurement 
perspectives has focused much on the issue of assessing relevant 
constructs for practical as opposed to research (e.g., construct valid-
ity) purposes. In the absence of measures of the more psychologically 
complex aspects of race and culture alluded to earlier, practitioners as 
well as researchers have had to rely on simplistic indicators of 
intrapsychic and interpersonal racial and/ or cultural dynamics. Thus, 
the most commonly used "predictor" or "measure" of racial or ethnic 
identity has been racial or ethnic categories as determined by sur-
names, self-designation, researcher categorization, and other simi-
larly ambiguous criteria. 
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In general, researchers and practitioners have noted the sterility 
of such categorical information for describing racially or culturally 
related behaviors. Even when researchers (e.g., Hauser, 1972; Phitmey, 
1990) have used racial or ethnic group categories to compare groups' 
responses on general identity measures derived from Erikson's 
psychosocial model, the results have been less than illuminating. 
Categorical ascriptions per se do not reveal much about a person's 
intrapsychic processes, CaImot discriminate among individuals within 
groups, and consequently, do not constitute assessment even in the 
narrow sense that Aftanas (1994) defines the term. 
Social cognitive theorists (e.g., Gardner et aI., 1988) often use the 
term "individual differences" to refer to assessment or measurement 
that occurs on an individual or person level as opposed to a "consen-
sual" or group level. Constructs measured consensually require 
groups of people to respond in the same directions, whereas individu-
alistic measurement requires description of separate persons. Most of 
the available racial identity measures have been investigated and 
interpreted by means of consensual models, which mayor may not 
yield the same kinds of information as would individual-difference 
models. Nevertheless, it is possible to adapt some principles from 
consensual models to make racial identity measures more amenable 
to individual-difference interpretations. 
Researchers and practitioners intending to use racial identity mea-
sures for diagnostic purposes are generally interested in discovering the 
extent to which individuals can be differentially described by racial 
identity schema. For racial identity measures to be useful, especially to 
practitioners, for understanding and/ or communicating with their clien-
tele about racial dynamics, practitioners need to be able to determine 
which schemas are dominant or recessive for each client. 
Profi le Error Bands 
Helms (1989) recommended that when researchers are using 
racial identity scores whose psychometric properties have been deter-
mined by means of consensual measurement models, racial identity 
profiles rather than single scores should be used to describe the 
individual. According to previously discussed theoretical formula-
tions, racial identity statuses (and consequently, schemas) are interre-
lated. Consequently, reliance on single scores risks discarding 
important information. Nevertheless, subscales differ in internal con-
sistency and response variability on a consensual level (see Table 4). 
Therefore, subscale scores of the same numerical value might not be 
of the same importance in the person's overall profile. 
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/ A common adaptation of a consensual approach that is used in 
personality measurement to evaluate the differential significance of 
intra-individual subscale scores involves use of the standard error of 
the difference between two scores (SEdif) . The SEdif allows one to 
consider variations in measurement error (i.e., reliability) between 
pairs of scores when interpreting intra-individual subscale score 
differences. It can also be used to determine whether a person's 
subscale scores, which appear to be different, are significantly differ-
ent. By using the SEdif, profile error bands or ranges can be developed 
to visually represent significantly different racial identity subscale 
scores for people on an individual level. 
The ranges shown in Table 5 were calculated at the .05 level of 
significance using the following formula from Anastasi (1982, p. 129): 
In this usage, SD is the average standard deviation of the two 
subscales being compared and rxx and r are the respective subscale 
reliabilities. YY 
Thus, Table 5 shows the minimum number of points by which 
each pair of scales must differ at the .05 level of significance. The 
numbers in the diagonals are the number of points by which a 
subscale score would have to differ from itself, as for example, in a 
Time l -:fime 2 testing paradigm. In case one does not have Table 5 
at hand, if one uses a point spread of 9 points, then one should obtain 
Table 5. Point Values For Determining Whether Subscale Scores Differ 
Significantly 
Scale C D R P A 
Contact (C) 8.84 
Disintegration (D) 8.33 7.4 1 
Reintegration (R) 8.57 7.52 7.60 
Pseudo Independence (P) 8.46 7.85 7.10 8.06 
Autonomy (A) 8.40 7.69 7.87 7.97 7.86 
NOle. Numbers in diagona l are the minimum amount of points by which scores mllst differ 
from themselves to be significant at the .05 alpha leve l. 
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a somewhat conservative estimate of whether a person's subscale 
scores differ from one another at the .05 level of significance. 
The reader might wish to use the SEdif point-values shown in 
Table 5 to estimate the differential strength of individuals' responses, 
particularly if he or she does not have access to large samples. 
However, if one does have large samples (e.g., at least 100), then one 
might wish to calculate local values for comparative purposes. 
Figure 1 uses a circular diagram to represent the schema profile 
bands for a person ("Sam"). The circle is used to emphasize the point 
Figure 1. Sam's configuration of scores, C = P = =, is not an lmcommon 
pattern (see Table 8) . Moreover, in single-scale comparisons (see Table 6), 
approximately 36% of respondents had high Contact scores and approxi-
mately 34% had high Pseudo-Independence scores. 
Pseudo Independence 24.0% 
Disintegration 15.0% 
~ii~~m~~AutonOmY 22.0% 
Contact 23.0% 
Raw % 
Scale Score Strength ile Comment 
Contact 36 High 85 Contact is higher than Disintegration 
Disintegration 23 Equal 40 Disintegration is lower than Contact 
and equals Reintegration 
Reintegrat ion 25 Low 60 Reintegration equals Disintegration and 
is lower than Pseudo Independence 
Pseudo 
Independence 38 Equal 80 Pseudo Independence is higher than 
Reintegration and equals Autonomy 
Autonomy 35 Equal 35 Autonomy equals Pseudo Independence 
and Contact 
Total 157 
180 HELMS 
that although racial identity statuses may be hierarchical in the sense 
of reflecting ascendingly complex information-processing strategies, 
they are not hierarchical in the sense that the use of one necessarily 
precludes use of another. That is, schemas are not mutually exclusive. 
Proceeding clockwise around the circumference of the circle, begin-
ning with Contact minus Disintegration, successive pairs of subscales 
were compared to obtain the frequencies shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Differential Frequencies of Strength of Endorsement of Pairs of 
Contiguou s Subscales 
Subscale Strength of Endorsement 
Comparison Very High Equal 
Direction High 
f % f % f % 
C>D 38 8.6 16 1 36.3 232 52.4 
D >C 4 .9 8 1.8 
D > R .2 15 3.4 408 92.1 
R > D 3 .7 16 3.6 
R > P 6 1.4 9 2.0 132 29.8 
P > R 147 33.2 149 33 .6 
P > A 12 2.7 4 14 93.5 
A>P 17 3.8 
A>C 6 1.4 77 17.4 355 80.1 
C>A 5 1.1 
Note. Very high scores differ by two or more standard errors; high scores differ 
by as much as one standard error; equal scores are within one standard error of 
each other. Scale abbreviations are C=Contact, D=Disintegration, R=Reintegration, 
P=Pseudo Independence, A=Autonomy. 
N=443 . 
4. IDENTITY MEASUREMENT 181 
For this sample of 443 respondents, Table 6 shows the fre-
quency distributions of respondents whose hypothesized develop-
mentally adjacent (e.g., Contact versus Disintegration) subscale scores 
differed by one ("High"), two ("Very High"), or zero ("Equal") 
standard-error-difference scores. So, for example, each individual's 
Disintegration score was subtracted from his or her Contact scores to 
determine which exceeded the point spread shown in Table 5. Thus, 
if a person's Contact score is between 8.33 and 16.66 points higher 
than his or her Disintegration score, then the Contact score is "High"; 
a Contact score at least 16.66 higher is considered "Very High" (see 
Figure 1). Obviously, in this example, positive scores suggest stron-
ger Contact reactions whereas negative scores suggest stronger Disin-
tegration reactions. 
Table 6 shows that for about half of the respondents (52.4%), 
Contact and Disintegration were expressed equivalently strongly (Le., 
within one standard error); for about 44.9%, Contact was expressed 
one standard error ("High") or at least two standard errors (i.e., "Very 
High") more strongly than Disintegration, whereas Disintegration 
was expressed more or much more strongly than Contact for only 
2.7% of the respondents. 
A general theme evident in Table 6 for this sample is that for four 
of the five comparisons (Contact vs. Disintegration, Disintegration vs. 
Reintegration, Autonomy vs. Pseudo Independence, and Autonomy 
vs. Contact), more than half of the respondents' subscale scores were 
equivalent (range = 52.4% to 93.5%). In the remaining comparison 
(Pseudo Independence vs. Reintegration), Pseudo Independence was 
much higher (33.2%) or higher (33.6%) than Reintegration for almost 
as many respondents as it was equivalent (29.8%). An implication of 
these observations for interpreting respondents' scores is that reliance 
on untransformed raw score comparisons may contribute to mislead-
ing conclusions. 
It is possible to obtain an individual profile by analyzing the 
person's five transformed (paired comparisons) scores for clusters, 
profiles, or patterns. Loglinear analysis was used to obtain the 
profiles summarized in Table 8. Of course, other clustering tech-
niques could be used to accomplish similar effects. However, in this 
case, because the high versus very high categories are nominal, 
loglinear analysis was used to determine the number of combinations 
of the five (positive very high to negative very high) possible transfor-
mations per (pair of) subscale comparisons. 
Although 61 (of a possible 55) patterns or combinations of the five 
transformed-comparison scores occurred, of these, only 13 were de-
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Table 7. Racial Identity Sub scale Correlations 
Scale 
Contact (C) 
Disintegration (D) 
Reintegration (R) 
Pseudo Independence (P) 
Autonomy (A) 
C o 
-0 I - 19 
-08 
HELMS 
R P A 
-39 53 39 
69 -47 -59 
-03 -45 -5 1 
-02 66 
-00 
Note. Decimals omitted to conserve space. Correlations above the diagonal are intercorre lations 
among raw subscales. Diagonals are correlations between rac ial identity subscales and 
Marlowe-Crowne socia l desirabi lity scores (M = 5.48. SD = 7.21). All va lues above the diagonal 
are significant beyond the .0 I alpha level. 
scriptive of as many as 10 respondents. Most respondents had 
comparatively high scores on at least one subscale. However, the 
most frequently occurring configuration (19.6%) was undifferentiated 
responding, meaning that none of the scales differed significantly 
from its neighbors. 
In Table 8, the first letter of a subscale is used to indicate that it 
was the higher of the adjacent-scale comparisons; letters with aster-
isks equal very high statuses, and equal signs indicate scores were 
within one standard error of one another. The most frequently 
occurring configurations with at least 10 respondents are shown in 
Table 8. 
Not shown in Table 8 are 28 singletons (response patterns character-
istic of one person) and 11 doublets (response patterns characteristic of 
two persons). Naturally, scale score differences that occur infrequently 
in Table 6 also occur infrequently in combinations in Table 8. For 
example, Autonomy is only very much (two standard errors) higher than 
Contact for six persons (see Table 6), and four of these people were 
singletons when their configurations were examined. 
Interpreting Response Patterns 
Qualitative interpretation of personality profiles is an enduring 
tradition in personality psychology. Following in this tradition, 
qualitative interpretations of profiles presumably can be used to assist 
clients in exploring their own issues of racial adjustment. Thus, some 
suggestions as to how to use the racial identity schema profile shown 
in Figure 1 might be useful. The circle is a heuristic device in that it 
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Table 8. Summary of Frequency of Occurrence of White Identity Profile 
Error Transformations 
C vs D D vs R 
C* 
C 
C 
C 
Comparison 
R vs P 
P* 
P* 
P* 
P 
P* 
P 
P 
P vs A A vs C 
A 
A 
A 
f % 
23 5.2 
19 4.3 
56 12.6 
60 13.5 
17 3.8 
19 4.3 
52 11.7 
10 2.2 
87 19.6 
Note. Racial identit y subscale abbreviations are C=Contact, D= Disintegration , R=Reintegration, 
P=Pseudo Independence, A=Autonomy; higher subscale scores are indicated by the First letter 
of subscale names. Symbols are = (within one standard error) , * (at least two standard errors 
difference). Only profi les with frequencies of at least 10 (N = 443) are reported. 
symbolizes that portion of the ego that the person hypothetically 
allots herself or himself for the processing of racial stimuli. Thus, in 
the case of inventory measures of racial identity (e.g., the WRIAS), the 
total scores might be assumed to symbolize the total space available 
to the person for responding to racial stimuli. The wedges in the circle 
are merely the percentages of the total scale score of each subscale. 
Standard error scores determine whether or not ostensibly different 
percentages of endorsement represent significantly different schema 
usage, and wedges that do not differ significantly have the same 
shading in the figure. Theoretically, total scores (e.g., ego space) could 
range from 50 to 250 points (i.e., from strong disagreement with all 
items to strong agreement) . In both the case of strong disagreement 
with all items and strong agreement with all items, such profiles 
should be discarded for research or assessment purposes because they 
indicate that the items did not elicit discriminative responses from the 
respondent. Table 3 shows that for this sample, raw scores actually 
ranged from 106 to 182. In Figure I, Sam's total score (the sum of his 
subscale scores) of 157 is shown on the bottom row. Sam's total score 
suggests that his profile is probably interpretable. 
Ideally, each person should endorse some items strongly and 
others not so strongly. However, a person with an overall score of 157 
could exhibit the same patterns of subscale responses as someone 
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with a higher overall score. Presumably, it is primarily the subscale 
patterns rather than single raw subscale scores per se that reflect race-
related behavior because the patterns suggest which schemas are 
dominant or recessive for the person. 
Sam's overall profile can be described as C = P = = (that is, Contact 
and Pseudo Independence were higher by one standard error than 
their contiguous neighbor to the right). Approximately 14% of the 
overall sample exhibited this pattern of responding (see Table 6). In 
Figure I, Sam's profile does not reveal any strong highs or lows. In 
fact, visually his racial identity expressions (schemas) are b~st de-
scribed by two clusters, one described by Disintegration and Reinte-
gration schemas, and the other described by the other three subscales 
(Contact, Pseudo Independence, and Autonomy). The Disintegra-
tion-Reintegration cluster appears to be a recessive set of schemas for 
him, whereas the Contact-Pseudo-Independent-Autonomy cluster 
appears to be dominant. By using the percentile (%ile) column of 
Sam's profile, one can get a sense of his level of expression of the 
schema relative to Carter's (chapter 4, this volume) consensual norms. 
It is not clear what to make of Sam's profile on either an intrapsychic 
or consensual level. However, his high Contact and Pseudo Indepen-
dence schema relative to his other subscale scores suggest that Sam 
uses a combination of denial, avoidance, and rationalization to cope 
with racial information (see Table 3). This intrapsychic interpretation 
is based on theoretical descriptions of Sam's highest schema. As 
compared to Carter's normative group, Sam also tends to express 
Contact (85th percentile) and Pseudo Independence (80th percentile) 
more strongly than most people. However, even though Reintegra-
tion is weakly expressed relative to his other schemas, it is relatively 
strong (60th percentile) when compared to others' expressions of the 
schema. Thus, again based on theoretical descriptions of the relevant 
schema, Sam's (presumed) denial and avoidance might be tin.ged with 
some elements of own-group superiority and outgroup inferiority. 
Also, in interpreting Sam's scores, findings from consensual con-
struct-validity studies of the racial identity variables might be of 
assistance in forming hypotheses about the meaning of Sam's scores. 
For example, Tokar and Swanson (1991) found that Contact expres-
sions (in combination with the other racial identity schemas) were 
uniquely predictive of a weak inner sense of self and difficulty in 
developing close meaningful relationships with others. Perhaps these 
personality characteristics also describe Sam's characteristics with 
respect to members of his own and/or other racial groups. Such 
hypotheses would certainly be worth a clinician's exploring with him. 
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Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
The primary theme underlying the various sections of this paper 
is the proposition that different measurement models-or at least 
more flexible usage of existing models-may be required to establish 
the psychometric properties of racial and etlmic identity personality 
inventories. Especially different models may be needed for measures 
intended to operationalize process models of race or culture than are 
needed for content models. 
An implicit assumption underlying process measures is that each 
individual's interpretative and judgmental cognitive-affective pro-
cesses are the real content of such measures. That is, the person's 
idiosyncratic reactions to items are a part of the measurement process. 
Much of what is measured by process measures is intrapsychic, and 
mayor may not be linear in expression. 
However, where cultural or racial content measures are con-
cerned, domains of relevant values, customs, traditions, external to 
the person do exist, and the person may use these external criteria to 
make construct-relevant self-assessments. Therefore, it ought to be 
possible to use classical measurement theory to construct homoge-
neous, psychometrically sound measures of content-specific constructs 
such as the ethnic identity measures discussed previously. Neverthe-
less, the domain of behavior or other characteristics on which such 
measures are based rarely has been specified. Moreover, as Phinney 
(1990) noted, investigators have been somewhat remiss about inves-
tigating the psychometric properties of their measures. 
Be that as it may, the measurement problems for racial identity 
process measures and ethnic identity content measures are different. 
In the case of ethnic identity measures as defined in this paper, many 
researchers have simply not provided psychometric information about 
their measures. Yet presumably this oversight could be easily rem-
edied by using standard methods of exploring reliability (e.g., coeffi-
cient alpha, test-retest) and validity of measures. 
However, in the case of process measures, the resolution of 
measurement dilemmas might not be so easily accomplished because 
researchers may have to become accustomed to interpreting summary 
test scores and items within such scores differently than they have 
heretofore. In their discussion of achievement tests, Snow an.d Lohman 
(1989) make a distinction between "sign-trait" and "sampling" inter-
pretations of such devices that is seemingly applicable to process 
measures of racial identity. Accordingly, they suggest that those who 
interpret test scores have tended to regard them as "signs" of some 
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underlying "trait" rather than as "samples" of the person's relevant 
mental structures or organizational processes. 
When one entertains sampling as an option for explaining indi-
viduals' reactions to racial identity items, then a wide array of 
methodologies become candidates for developing and interpreting 
measures. In addition, to the alternate strategies discussed in the 
present paper (e.g., cluster analysis, multidimensional scaling), Snow 
and Lohman (1989) suggest that "any other method that sorts cogni-
tive tasks [or racial reactions] into categories of closely related (i.e., 
similarly sampled) performances provides a map to guide further 
cognitive [affective] psychological analysis" (p. 317). 
Presently, researchers seem to be fixated on coefficient alpha, 
inter-subscale correlations, and factor analysis as the only methodolo-
gies for developing racial identity measures and/or judging their 
effectiveness. This closed-minded perspective frequently has led 
them to discount their own findings in support of racial identity 
theory (e.g., Swanson et aI., 1994; Yanico et aI., 1994). Perhaps the 
issues raised in this paper can provide some directions for researchers 
to assess the extent to which their measurement models fit the racial 
or ethnic identity conceptual model being investigated. 
Finally, some examples of the ways in which the racial identity 
measures might be used to assess respondents' quality of race-related 
behavior have been proposed. However, more empirical research 
specifically focused on patterns, profiles, or clusters of racial identity 
subscales and their relation to other attitudes, emotions, and behav-
iors is needed. This type of information would enhance the interpre-
tative process by providing practitioners with the kinds of information 
that could be used to assist clients in their racial identity adjustment. 
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